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In this paper, I want to discuss a problem that arises when we try to understand the 
connections between justification, knowledge, and suspension.1  It wouldn’t be quite 
right to say that these are Sosa’s problems. We’ll see that we can find solutions 
working in his telic virtue-theoretic framework. 
 In what follows, I shall try to show that some prima facie plausible claims 
about knowledge and the justification for judging and suspending are difficult to 
reconcile with the possibility of a kind of knowledge or apt belief that a thinker 
cannot aptly judge to be within her reach. I shall argue that if we try (as we should) 
to accommodate the possibility of this kind of knowledge, we should reject a widely 
held view about justification. We can correct this mistaken view about the 
connection between justification and knowledge by connecting justification to a kind 
of competence, but not the one we might have expected. In the course of this 
discussion, I shall flag some questions about the explanatory ambitions of the telic 
virtue-theoretic approach because, to my discredit, I’m not quite sure how to answer 
them. I hope they’re good questions and hope that someone can answer them.  
   
1. Connections 
Let’s get down to business. I want to discuss the relationships between knowledge, 
justified suspension, and justified belief. The discussion of justification mostly 
occurs late in the book where Sosa outlines his response to the new evil demon 
problem (2021: 188-205), but it’s clear that he accepts at least this much about 
justification and knowledge:  
JK1. It’s possible to justifiably believe p without knowing 
that p (2021: 189). 
JK2. If you know p, you justifiably believe p (2021: 200).2 
These claims are pretty widely accepted. If you accept them, you might agree with 
Sosa that having a justified belief is only part of what it is to know. Additional factors 
must be present for a justified belief to constitute knowledge. This will include truth, 
but not just truth. Some kinds of accidental connections between justified beliefs and 
the facts will ensure that we don’t know what we believe to be the case. Thus, we 
need more than truth to take us from justified belief to knowledge, but we can 
subtract truth from knowledge and justification will remain if we hold certain factors 
fixed.  
 
1 I would like to thank Adam Carter for his valuable feedback on a previous draft 
and Ernest Sosa for his generous response to the present paper.   
2 The cases of ‘sub-credal knowledge’ (2021: 79) complicate things. They’re 
somewhat peripheral to Sosa’s interests, but not peripheral to the sorts of things that 
worry me.  
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 On Sosa’s view of knowledge, knowing is a matter of aptly believing. An 
apt belief must be accurate, adroit, and accurate because adroit. It is accurate iff it is 
true. It is adroit if skilfully formed. Our understanding of what success consists of 
should inform our account of what it takes to perform skilfully. A belief can only be 
accurate because adroit if its accuracy manifests skill. We can think of this as 
instancing a more general pattern. When we succeed, we attempt. Attempts can be 
successful or unsuccessful. They can be skilful or unskilful. Even if skilful and 
successful, some will be successful because skilful and some will be both without 
success being due to the skill exercised. As Sosa develops this, true belief is a kind 
of success. Competently formed belief manifests a kind of skill. Knowledge is what 
we have when accuracy is attributable to competence.  
 Where should we locate justification in this framework? One notion of 
justification is one on which justified beliefs are competently or skilfully formed.3 
Justified beliefs can miss their target much in the way that the most skilful shot might 
be knocked off target by an unexpected gust of wind. This fits well with the way that 
most epistemologists think about the connection between justification, knowledge, 
and truth. On this way of thinking about things, part of what it takes to be a knower 
(and not someone who merely holds a belief that’s true) is that you’ve manifested 
the right kind of skill in forming the belief or in judging. Notice that if we think about 
things this way, we seem to be suggesting that the theory of justification should help 
us understand what it is to know, not using our understanding of what it is to know 
to help us understand what it is to justifiably believe.  
 In keeping with this theoretical orientation, Sosa wants to characterise skill 
and competence in terms of truth or accuracy, the success condition for belief and 
judgment (according to many).4 While taking this starting point has convinced some 
to embrace some familiar truth-centred views (e.g., a Lockean view of rational belief 
on which beliefs are rational to hold iff they maximise expected accuracy, a reliabilist 
view on which beliefs are justified iff (roughly) they are the beliefs produced by 
faculties or processes that deliver a sufficiently good ratio of true to false beliefs), 
Sosa’s view is that there are interesting and important connections between the 
prospect of knowing and suspension. Among the things that he wants his 
framework to help us understand is how it could be that a belief falls short if inapt 
even if accurate (2021: 145).5 
 
3 This can be refined further when we take account of the distinctions between 
complete competence, inner competence, and innermost competence. If we tie 
justification to the right notion of competence, we can see how even the 
systematically deceived might have beliefs that are justified. The key is to recognise 
that their failures might be due to shape and situation rather than skill (2021: 201). 
4 Note that, for Sosa, the success condition for judgment is not mere accuracy.  
5 On some views, we would have to deny this. Suppose (even though it is not 
uncontroversial) that we cannot know that a ticket in a large, fair lottery will lose or 
has lost if we rely only on our knowledge of how unlikely it is for the ticket to win. 
We would expect Lockeans and many reliabilists to agree that you can justifiably 
believe the ticket lost even if you’re certain that  
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 On some views, the prospect of believing without knowing or without aptly 
believing shouldn’t deter the would-be believer or judge.6 Suppose (even though it 
is not uncontroversial) that we cannot know that a ticket in a large, fair lottery will 
lose or has lost if we rely only on our knowledge of how unlikely it is for the ticket 
to win or to have won.7 We would expect Lockeans and many reliabilists to say that 
you can justifiably believe the ticket lost even if you’re certain that this belief won’t 
be knowledge, won’t be apt, etc. We might also expect that we can justifiably believe 
conjunctions that combine a belief about the outcome with a negative evaluation of 
the belief (e.g., that this could be justifiably believed: I don’t know whether it won, 
but it didn’t). This, however, just seems completely wrong to me. I think we should 
instead accept and endeavour to explain this claim about ignorance and suspension:  
IS1: If it’s certain that you’re not in a position to know 
whether p, you should suspend on whether p.8  
Think of this as a Moorean constraint. Recall Moore’s observation that <dogs bark 
but I don’t know that they do> seems like an awfully strange thing to say and related 
observations that it would be strange to judge or believe this. Note that IS1 doesn’t 
say, that if you don’t know, you ought to suspend. We’re not saying that BIVs who 
couldn’t know that they don’t know ought to suspend. What we’re saying is that if 
it’s clear that your answer to a question would be inapt, you shouldn’t (yet) judge 
or believe. It’s here that educated guesses, conjectures, hunches, and the like fill in 
in the absence of a belief that brings inquiry to its close. 
 Let’s consider the connection between justification and suspension. If we 
think of judging or believing as alternatives to suspending, it’s tempting to think 
that if belief or judgment is proper, suspension is not required:  
JS: If you justifiably believe p, you’re not required to 
suspend on whether p. 
If you’re taking an exam where the penalty for incorrect answers is greater than the 
penalty for not answering (e.g., the SATs were like this, but most pop quizzes in high 
school were not) and it’s agreed by all that you shouldn’t put an answer down, the 
question as to whether it’s fine to put a question down has been settled. 
 We have a handful of prima facie plausible claims about knowledge, 
ignorance, justification, and suspension before us. Here is where things get 
complicated. Aptness seems to preclude kinds of risk. At the very least, we can 
probably agree that an apt belief is one that, given the thinker’s evidence and 
epistemic position, isn’t or wasn’t likely to be mistaken.9 Still, aptness might be 
 
6 See McGlynn (2013).  
7 See Nelkin (2000) for discussion and defence. In my view, the observation that we 
don’t know in such cases is an important part of the explanation as to why we 
shouldn’t blame or punish others relying only on naked statistical evidence. See 
Littlejohn (2020).  
8 This seems to be a consequence of the claim that knowledge is a norm of judgment 
and of suspension (2021: 53). 
9 Getting the details right isn’t trivial because there are different views about the 
kinds of risks and dangers of error that threaten knowledge.  Sosa (2021: 19) doesn’t 
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compatible with a kind of risk, a risk of inaptness. First-order competences are 
concerned with the first kind of risk, the risk of error. We manifest second-order 
competences when we aptly judge that a judgment is apt, affirming that worries 
about the inaptness of a judgment are misplaced. 
I’d expect some broad agreement that the best non-sceptical views allow 
that when someone knows, the evidential probability that they know needn’t be 1. 
This is obvious on fallibilist views (i.e., views on which P(p) can be less than 1 when 
p is known), but infallibilists might also want to allow that we can know while being 
rationally uncertain about whether we know.10 Questions. If we agree that knowing 
is compatible with the risk of believing without knowing, how great could this risk 
be without subverting or destroying knowledge? How does this risk of inaptness 
bear on justification? 
If the risk of not knowing when you know were always negligible, we might 
be able to ignore the issue, but it might be that the best non-sceptical views should 
recognise this possibility:  
KRI: You can know p even if it’s improbable in light of 
your total evidence that you know p. 
It wasn’t that long ago that I took the Life in the United Kingdom test as part of an 
application to gain permanent resident status. It included questions about history, 
law, culture, and so on. To study, I had to commit to memory all sorts of facts about 
jury duty, the inventor of the hydroplane, the right to vote, the War of the Roses, 
football, Queen Elizabeth, demographics, King Cnut, famous tapestries, etc. Lots of 
trivia. Lots of independent sources gave me the answers I needed. Much of this 
knowledge is now thankfully gone, but I had enough to pass the exam.  
Let’s suppose that you’ve taken an exam of n questions like this. You’re told 
that you passed with flying colours, getting only one wrong. Assuming that you’re 
not dogmatic (i.e., you accept their testimony) and you recall the questions and your 
answers, you now either have an inconsistent set of beliefs that is certain to contain 
one that’s inapt or you’ve suspended judgment on something that you knew 
initially. I’d think that, provided that you don’t suspend, you could have n+1 beliefs 
(the original n beliefs and one additional belief about their correctness) where n-1 of 
the initial beliefs constituted knowledge and continue to do so. If this testimonial 
belief about your beliefs is also knowledge, you have n pieces of knowledge out of 
n+1 beliefs. This, given reasonable expectations about how well you’d do on the 
exam, is a reason to celebrate, not to despair. If your confidence in each of the n+1 
beliefs being knowledge is the equally distributed and your confidence aligns with 
the evidential probabilities, for each belief the probability that it’s knowledge is 
n/n+1.  
 
think the knowledge-threatening risks should be understood in modal terms in the 
way that, say, Williamson (2000) does.  
10 See Williamson (2000) for a defence of a kind of infallibilist view on which 
knowing doesn’t ensure that we’re in a position to know that we know.  
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 If n is large, suspending on each belief shows a pathological aversion to the 
risk of believing falsehoods or believing without knowing.11 If n is small, we face 
two questions. Can n be small and still be a case in which some subset of the beliefs 
constitute knowledge? How does the size of n bear on questions about suspension? 
My own view is there will be some n such that n can be small enough that a thinker 
could know even when they know that for any claim the probability they know that 
claim is less than .5. For example, a thinker might learn that she and four friends 
seem to recall vividly some event from their respective pasts where three of the five 
have been slipped a drug that has significantly impacts their recollection of past 
events so that it’s certain that in three cases out of five the subjects wouldn’t have 
knowledge even if their beliefs about past events were correct. I don’t believe 
learning about this setup necessarily would prevent the subjects who weren’t 
drugged from knowing the things about the past that they seem to recall, but I do 
think that if each of the five ought to say that it’s not more likely than not that they 
know, they should suspend.  
 In light of this, let’s say that knowledge is compatible with a non-negligible 
risk of not knowing and consider what happens if I’m right that the risk of ignorance 
can give us decisive reason to suspend:  
IS2: If it’s improbable in light of your total evidence 
that you know p, you should suspend on whether p. 
If we accept that improbable knowledge is possible and we say that we ought to 
suspend when the risk of believing without knowing is too great (e.g., when it’s 
more likely than not that we’re not in a position to know), the connections sketched 
above cannot hold. Suppose we have a case of improbable knowledge in which you 
know p. By hypothesis, you know, so JK2 says that you justifiably believe. By JS, it’s 
not true that you should suspend. By IS2, you should suspend. Something has to 
give.  
 
2. Resolving the Tension   
We have to abandon at least one of the following claims: knowledge requires 
justification (JK2); we don’t have to suspend when we’re justified in believing (JS); 
we have to suspend when it’s improbable that we know (IS2); it’s possible to know 
even when it’s improbable that we do (KRI). 
 The least promising way to go would be to deny that improbable knowledge 
is possible or to say that we sometimes should suspend even when we justifiably 
believe. The cases above can be convincingly used to show that it’s possible to know 
when it’s not more likely than not given our total evidence that we know. I also find 
Williamson’s (2011) defence of improbable knowledge ultimately convincing even 
if initially quite counterintuitive. This is a guess, but I’d think that Sosa would also 
not be too keen to respond to the above by simply denying KRI. In various examples 
involving archers, game show contestants, etc., it seems to us that the success of our 
attempts can be attributable to ability even if the relevant agents harboured perfectly 
 
11 See Ryan (1991) for defence of the view that it cannot be rational for a thinker to 
believe each proposition in a set of propositions if one is known to be false. 
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reasonable doubts about their own abilities and mistakenly took their chances of 
success to be low. This is part of what makes it tempting to recognise that aptness 
can be present even when meta-aptness is not. As for JS, this claim seems close to 
trivial if we think of justification as something that permits and think of judging or 
believing and suspending as alternatives.  
 This leaves us with a choice. We have to reject JK2, IS2, or both. Let’s start 
with IS2. If we deny IS2, we can say that it’s compatible with excellence in the 
relevant domains that our agent refrains from refraining and forbears from 
forbearing even when it’s quite likely that a performance will be inapt. On this way 
of thinking, any attempt, provided that it is apt, is one that the agent needn’t have 
refrained from. All is well because all ended well.  
I can imagine someone offering the following case for rejecting IS2. We’re 
assuming that it’s possible to have aptness even when it’s not at all likely that an 
attempt will be apt. Whilst IS2 tells us that we might need to suspend in spite of 
aptness, but this overlooks the fact that accuracy, correctness, success and the like 
are quite likely since a great risk of inaccuracy is, presumably, incompatible with 
aptness. If accuracy, correctness, success and the like are likely, suspension 
shouldn’t be required. That’s a reason to reject IS2.  
 I think this is an interesting argument. I don’t quite know how, in Sosa’s telic 
framework, to respond to it, but we might worry that this rationale for rejecting IS2 
also threatens IS1. Here’s why. The argument against IS2 might be convincing given 
a certain evaluative outlook according to which successful attempts are seen as more 
desirable than omissions (i.e., accurate belief > suspension). If we accept this, we can 
still say, in keeping with Sosa’s take on the swamping problem, that apt attempts 
are more desirable than inapt successes, but then it seems that if we say that inapt 
success is more desirable than suspension, we’re saying that anyone who prefers 
suspension in cases where inaptness is likely but success is also likely prefers 
something less desirable to something more desirable. If we don’t think that 
inaptness is undesirable, it’s hard to see why IS1 would hold in full generality. 
Here’s an example to illustrate what I have in mind. If you think that in lottery cases 
it’s nearly certain that we’ll have an accurate belief and certain that we’ll have an 
inapt belief, it is hard to see why someone would accept IS1 if they thought both that 
success is better than an omission and that there’s nothing undesirable about 
inaptness per se. We can explore this set of issues further in §3. Since I think IS1 is a 
very plausible claim about the connection between ignorance and warranted 
suspension, I’d like to explore a different line of response.  
 Here’s a different way to resolve the tension. We can deny JK2 and deny 
that knowledge implies justification. If we say that beliefs constitute knowledge 
when their accuracy manifests adroitness (as this notion is normally understood), 
we can say that some beliefs might be adroit (as we normally understand this notion) 
without being justified. Specifically, if a belief or judgment is, given the thinker’s 
evidence, too likely to be inapt, this would be a decisive reason to suspend even if, 
given the thinker’s evidence, it’s quite likely that the relevant belief or judgment 
would be accurate. Since the evidence only makes it likely that the belief or judgment 
is inapt, we’d allow for improbable knowledge and say that the improbability of 
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knowledge makes it necessary to suspend and thus prevents a belief from being 
justified in spite of its aptness and adroitness. To put this in terms of the archery 
analogy, a shot that might be apt but is, given the archer’s evidence quite unlikely 
to be apt, might for that reason be one that the excellent archer wouldn’t select.  
As we’ll see, this revision to the theory of justification and its connection to 
knowledge can have important implications for how we understand some of the 
central concepts in telic virtue epistemology. 
Here’s a pitch for rejecting JK2 that strikes me as plausible. A response like 
belief or judgment is justified when it manifests the thinker’s competence, but we 
need to take care in specifying which competences matter. The ones that matter are 
the ones operative in those responses that show the thinker can properly manage 
the various normative pressures that are incumbent upon her. Some of these 
pressures can be described in terms of accuracy—the risk of believing falsely is a 
normative pressure that a rational thinker must be sensitive to. Some pressures, 
however, cannot be described just in terms of accuracy—the risk of believing inaptly 
is not just the risk of believing inaccurately and this is another normative pressure 
that should weigh on rational thinkers when trying to choose between belief and 
suspension. Why think that? This doesn’t go very deep, but this is what we should 
think if we accept IS1. If we accept IS1, we recognise that the prospect of believing 
inaptly is one that should worry the would-be believer or judge and should be one 
that motivates this thinker to suspend. So, it’s another normative pressure that 
matters to the justification of belief and judgment.  
Once we see that, we should be open to rejecting JK2, not because we don’t 
see any interesting connection between competence and justification, but because 
we should recognise that the competences that matter to justification include but 
don’t just include those that have to do with accuracy and reliable means for forming 
accurate beliefs. It must also include a meta-competence that’s operative and helps 
us discriminate between an unreasonable aversion to the risk of inapt belief that 
leads us to suspend when suspension is not warranted and the risk of believing when 
the risk of inapt belief is too great. 
If we think of the adroitness of an attempt in terms of the exercise of some 
competence and competences in terms of dispositions to reliably succeed in suitable 
circumstances, a truth-centred conception of epistemic success will encourage us to 
think of adroitness in a truth-centred way, too. From the truth-centred perspective, 
it is, as hinted at above, difficult to see why the prospect that an attempt won’t likely 
be apt would be a reason to suspend if the prospect of success is sufficiently high. If, 
however, we wanted to revise our theory of justification to accommodate the idea 
that the certainty that some attempt that’s likely to be accurate will be inapt, we 
might say that justification depends upon first-order and meta-competences and 
includes the first-order competences that it does because of this concern for believing 
or judging aptly. 
This line might be appealing to someone who either doesn’t think there is 
anything desirable per se about accuracy or thinks that there’s a disvalue that 
attaches to inapt attempts and that it is overall more desirable to refrain than to 
succeed by means of an inapt attempt. Given this conception of value, IS1 makes 
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perfectly good sense in the lottery-like cases where the expectation of accuracy is 
high and the expectation of aptness is low. Given this conception of value, IS2 would 
at least be prima facie plausible. 
Recall what Sosa says about norms:  
A desirable level of human knowledge is the apt judgment, 
the fully apt alethic affirmation. Such knowledge constitutes a 
desirable sort of success in inquiry. It thus provides a (main) 
norm of judgment … And it is not only a norm of judgment, 
but also a norm of suspension … The subsidiary aim of proper 
suspension is that of affirming alethically if and only if one 
would thus affirm aptly (2021: 53). 
I quite like the idea that there is some sense in which we shouldn’t believe what we 
don’t know and that fits with what Sosa says in this passage, but insofar as we can 
rationally be quite certain that we know when we don’t, it seems that this 
understanding of the norm is one according to which it captures a kind of objective 
suitability. What I’m suggesting is that we think of justified belief as something that 
ensures that we’re not required to suspend and that the requirement to suspend 
could be grounded in the risk of violating this norm of objective suitability. This 
seems very much in the spirit of much of what Sosa says even if it means adopting 
a conception of justification that doesn’t fit with his precise characterisation.   
 Sosa’s attitude towards justification is broadly pluralist. By that, I mean he’s 
open to the idea that there are different legitimate ways of understanding talk of 
‘justification’ and he’s sceptical that ordinary usage will narrow us down to one right 
way to understand such talk (2021: 197). Someone might say that the above shows 
that there’s one notion of justification such that (JK2) turns out to be mistaken given 
this notion of justification and wonder whether there’s some other notion of 
justification that suits (JK2). I doubt it. I suspect that the considerations above rule 
that out. I don’t think the beliefs formed in indifference about whether they’d be apt 
or whether they’d be knowledge are ones that we can think of as justified. If we reject 
(JK2) for the reasons offered here, we will have to move away from the project of 
using a theory of justification to help explain the difference between knowledge and 
non-knowledge. We seem to have moved pretty close to the approach that says that 
we use the difference between knowledge and non-knowledge to give a theory of 
justification by, say, revising truth-centred accounts of what epistemic success 
consists in or by identifying rational pressures that help determine which responses 
would be justified that couldn’t be described in truth-centred terms.   
 I’d drop (JK2) and offer this account of propositional justification:  
(JK3) You have justification to believe p iff it is sufficiently 
probable that you’re in a position to know p.12 
 
12 In Dutant and Littlejohn (2021), we defend this view of justification and give a 
theory of defeat according to which defeaters defeat by indicating that we’re not in 
a position to know. Following Dorst (2019), we suggest that the threshold is 
determined by taking account of the desirability and undesirability of forming 
beliefs that have certain features.  If we hold fixed the desirability of having an apt 
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This account allows for two kinds of independence between justification and 
knowledge. A belief might be subjectively suitable or proper without being 
objectively suitable (i.e., we can have justification to believe what we don’t know) 
and (JK3) says as much. We might also find that objectively suitable attempts are not 
always subjectively suitable owing to the risk that the attempt will be objectively 
unsuitable. This account says as much, too. It predicts (nicely, in my view) that in 
suitably large preface-type cases where the risk of believing each proposition in a set 
known to be inconsistent is sufficiently small, you have justification to believe each 
in the set. When the size of that set contracts or the number of known error increases, 
we might find a case in which there’s a good chance that some propositions in the 
set can be known when nevertheless it’s not rational to believe any in the set since 
the difference between them might give no clues about which can be known and the 
risk of believing without knowing in each case is too great. 
 Notice that on this view, the manifestation of the meta-competence relevant 
for justification needn’t manifest in an outright belief or judgment that the first-order 
belief would or would not be apt. The manifestation of this competence would only 
require that the choice to judge or withhold is properly grounded in the subject’s 
credences about the conditions that matter for aptness. This, I think, is a good thing 
as there will be situations in which we can neither believe that a belief or judgment 
would be apt or would not be apt, but we should still be able to manifest the relevant 
meta-competence in such cases by believing or withholding.  
 
3. Suspension  
We’re assuming that improbable knowledge is possible. I’ve argued that if it is 
possible, we should recognise the possibility of knowledge without justification. We 
can think of this knowledge as the kind of knowledge that Lasonen-Aarnio (2010) 
drew to our attention to—knowledge that is within reach that it’s not reasonable to 
reach for. I think recognising this kind of knowledge makes sense of suitably 
designed preface-type cases and captures what’s going on in Williamson’s (2011) 
unmarked clock cases. I would add that it also makes sense of our intuitions about 
cases where there’s some chance that your rational faculties have been compromised 
by drugs that impair your reasoning but have no druggy side-effects that would 
alert you to their presence. When it’s certain that, say, you’ve been slipped one of 
those drugs that messes with your capacity to do logic or mental math, it seems that 
you ought to suspend and that that’s because it’s certain that your relevant beliefs 
won’t be apt. When there’s only a chance that your reasoning has been influenced 
by such drugs, it seems the probability of suffering the effects of the drug is crucial 
for determining whether you ought to suspend or should instead stick by your initial 
judgment. Suspending when the risk is small might seem like one kind of mistake. 
Judging when the risk is large seems like another. 
 This is all pitched at the level of intuition. I think such intuitions are helpful 
for testing claims about the connections between justified belief, justified 
 
belief (or accurate belief, in Dorst’s case) but increase the undesirability of having an 
inapt belief (or inaccurate belief), the threshold for sufficiency will increase.  
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suspension, and knowledge, but we haven’t seen much theory that supports the 
claims I’ve been appealing to. Given the resources of telic virtue epistemology, can 
we give a theoretical backing for the Moorean constraint and the related claims 
about the justification of belief and suspension?  
 Let’s start at the beginning. If our judgments and beliefs are successful when 
accurate, we might say that there is something desirable about accuracy. I suspect 
lots of epistemologists might say this to capture what seems like a platitude:  
(1) If p is true, it is more desirable to believe p than to 
believe ~p and more desirable to suspend than to believe 
~p. 
Note that this doesn’t tell us how to compare true belief and suspension, but 
someone might want to add this:  
(2) If p is true, it is more desirable to believe p than to suspend. 
This much is compatible with the sorts of things that veritists say about epistemic 
value. If we say only this much, have we left something important out? It seems so. 
We haven’t yet said a thing about knowledge. Let’s say that simple veritism is the 
view that combines (1) and (2) and enriched veritism adds one more claim:  
(3) It is more desirable to know p than to believe p without 
knowing it.  
The telic virtue-theoretic framework gives us a nice story about why it should be 
that (3) or something in the vicinity of it is true. The relevant beliefs and judgments 
are attempts and we should recognise that the attempts that are successful because 
of skill are more valuable than those that are successful but not because of skill.  
 Note that by enriching veritism in this way, we make some progress in 
addressing things like the Meno problem and the swamping problem, but let’s set 
those aside because we’re here interested in finding the theoretical backing for the 
Moorean constraint. There are some questions about epistemic value that enriched 
veritism doesn’t seem to answer and some questions about epistemic value that the 
enriched and simple veritist views might disagree about. What should we say about 
the desirability of knowing, believing without knowing, and suspending? 
Specifically, where should we locate suspension and accurate but inapt belief in the 
ordering? Which of these should we opt for? 
(4) It is better to suspend than to believe p accurately 
but inaptly.  
(5) It is better to believe p accurately but inaptly than to 
suspend.  
I can imagine the veritists saying that what makes the enriched veritist view 
plausible is that accuracy being due to adroitness enhances the value of something 
that’s itself valuable, more valuable than suspension. And they might say that the 
telic virtue-theoretic story about this holds up well. They might see it as favouring 
(5). The problem here is that (5) makes it difficult to explain claims like IS1 and IS2. 
If it’s possible for a belief to be certain or nearly certain to be accurate but also certain 
or nearly certain to be inapt, it seems that IS2 and IS1 should stand or fall depending 
upon whether we opt for (4) or for (5).  
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 Now, ultimately, I would like to break more decisively away from the 
veritist views and try to explain the Moorean constraints, IS1 and IS2, by appeal to 
a very different sort of value theory, a gnostic theory that consists of two claims:  
(6) Knowledge is more desirable than suspension.   
(7) Inapt belief is less desirable than suspension. 
This gnostic theory makes it really easy to explain IS1 and IS2, but the problem with 
this theory is that it’s hard to justify in a setting where everyone takes it for granted 
that accurate belief is a kind of success that makes it desirable to some extent. I would 
need a good theoretical rationale for rejecting (5), but I’m not quite sure I see how to 
get there without appealing to some assumptions about how we ought to score full 
success, partial success, and complete failure.  
 To make this a bit more concrete, let me illustrate using an example that 
concerns the evaluation of complete success and complete failure.13 I’m using a 
different example to suit my purposes, but I suspect my worries about my ability to 
effectively undercut views that threaten the Moorean constraint are connected to 
that example. I’m imagining an objector who claims that it’s not true of performances 
generally that we aim for the avoidance of inaptness and that’s either because or at 
least related to the observation that some failures aren’t seen as disvaluable or 
undesirable even if they are seen as less desirable than success. Consider the scoring 
of exams. There are some exams that score things like this: 
Scoring Scheme 1: For each correct answer, you’ll get x 
points.   
There are some exams that score things like this:  
Scoring Scheme 2: For each correct answer, you’ll get x 
points. For each incorrect answer, you’ll lose y points. If 
you don’t answer, you neither gain nor lose points. 
Let’s suppose every test taker wants to maximise her score. In either set up, we can 
say that an accurate answer is desirable, but the rational strategies to get through the 
exams differ significantly. It’s always irrational to ‘suspend’ or fail to answer given 
the first scoring scheme, but not the second. Moreover, the values we assign to x and 
y will, given our epistemic state, determine when it’s rational to omit or to answer. 
If the absolute value of y is much greater than that of x, we should only answer when 
we’re very certain, but if the absolute value of x is much greater than y, we should 
be willing to guess when we’re not at all likely to be right. 
 This example doesn’t raise questions about the additional complexities of 
scoring partial success (e.g., true but inapt belief) along with full success (i.e., apt 
belief) and complete failure (e.g., false belief), but it should be clear that without 
clear guidance on these evaluative issues, it’s hard to see whether theory will 
support our preferred views about when we ought to suspend and when it’s proper 
to judge. The methodological question I want to raise is this. I feel somewhat 
confident in my judgments about what a skilful attempt would be, what success 
would be, etc. when given more details about the full scoring scheme. I feel less 
confident, however, in trying to choose between different scoring schemes given 
 
13 This might be connected an issue that Sosa (2021: 94, fn. 9) discusses. 
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only a specification of what success consists in, what would constitute a failure, and 
what the agent’s aims are because I see only how to use the telic virtue-theoretic 
framework to explain why some types of success are more desirable than others, but 
not to understand whether and why omission or suspension is preferable to partial 
success or success that’s due to a significant degree of luck. This might not a major 
problem with the approach. It might be that the ambition isn’t to show that some 
unique system of scoring is the right one without importing additional assumptions 
beyond the bare structure of a telic normative framework.14  
 These worries might be completely misplaced. The cases that get me 
worried about a crucial detail are cases in which I think a judgment is nearly certain 
to be accurate and certain to be inapt. These are the lottery cases. If someone says 
that such cases are cases of apt belief, it’s difficult to get the problem I have in mind 
off the ground. And if we start from the gnostic starting point and say that true but 
inapt beliefs aren’t really cases of inapt success on the grounds that success consists 
in having hold of the truth and not just having hold of a belief that happens to be 
true, these problems won’t arise and we get IS1 and IS2 on the cheap. If, however, 
we take on board some veritist assumptions, I find myself stuck unable to say 
anything helpful about why we should say that all failure must be worse than 
refraining from attempting (as opposed to just lacking value) or why it is more 
desirable to refrain than to try and succeed inaptly. 
 
4. Conclusion 
I have argued that if aptness or knowledge is necessary for objectively suitable belief 
or judgment and that the certain absence of aptness or knowledge requires us to 
suspend, we should revise a standard picture of justification according to which 
justification is necessary but insufficient for knowledge. This might require us to 
deny that justification is connected to a kind of competence (i.e., the one associated 
with adroitness), but it allows us to retain a connection between justification and 
meta-competence. On this view, we have justification to believe iff the risk of 
believing inaptly is sufficiently small. This view, I think, fits nicely with Sosa’s telic 
virtue-theoretic approach, but we’ve also seen that it might be difficult to explain 
why the evident inaptness of a belief or judgment is a decisive reason to suspend 
without appeal to something like an epistemic value theory or set of scoring rules 
that might not be easily derivable from an account of the difference between 
excellent and inferior attempts.  
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